sexta-feira, 31 de julho de 2015
quinta-feira, 30 de julho de 2015
segunda-feira, 20 de julho de 2015
Os amigos alemães de Dominique Strauss Khan
To my German
friends
Dominique
Strauss Khan ( carta aberta publicada no Jornal Figaro em 19/07/2015)
Hollande stood
his ground. Merkel faced up to those who didn’t want an agreement at any price.
It’s to their credit. There is a good chance a plan will be put in place,
reducing if not removing the risks of a Grexit. It’s not enough, but it’s
welcome.
The conditions
of the agreement, however, are positively alarming for those who still believe
in the future of Europe. What happened last weekend was for me profoundly
damaging, if not a deadly blow.
There are of
course those who do not believe in that future, who will be rejoicing. And they
are many, from two different camps.
First there are
those who are too short-sighted. Those whose nationalism prevents them from
seeing beyond their own borders and who vainly ponder upon Europe’s very
existence. But who knows what Europe really is? Who knows whence this continent
sprang? Was Europe born in the Homeric poems of the IX Century before our time?
Was it born in the mud and the mire of the trenches where the bloods of all the
world did mingle, blending their colors, brewing their dreams and
cross-breeding their ambitions? Was it born even closer to home, and more
prosaically, in the laboriously detailed treaties of the European Union? There
was no doubt in the mind of Erasmus, who, in 1516, wrote in the Complaint of
peace: “An Englishman is the enemy of a Frenchman purely because he is French,
and the Briton hates the Scotsman because he is a Scot; the Germans are daggers
drawn with the French, the Spanish with both. O the perversity of mankind! Such
superficial differences as the name of a country are enough to divide them! Why
do they not rather reconcile themselves with all the values they share?”
Then there are
those who are too long-sighted. These are capable of seeing beyond their own
frontiers, but have chosen not to support the community that is nevertheless
closest to them. They turn to others, further West, to which they are willing
to succumb. This is what was on Cioran’s mind and the echo of his impotent rage
reminds us once more: “How can we count on the awakening of Europe,” he
laments, “or on its anger? Its fate and even its revolts are settled elsewhere.”
And then there
are those, like myself, who are in neither camp, and it to those that I now
speak; to my German friends who believe in the Europe that together we once
wanted; those who believe that a European culture exists. Those who know that
the countries that define its contours, and of which the history books
generally tell only of conflicts, have shaped a common culture that is like no
other. A culture not richer than any other, nor more glorious, nor more noble,
but no less so either. Forged in this peculiar alloy, a blend of individualism
and egalitarian universalism, it embodies and upholds – more than any other –
that which the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas calls “citizen solidarity”,
when he writes, for example, that “the fact that the death penalty is still in
force in other countries is there to remind us what makes our normative
consciousness so unique”.
We are the
custodians of that culture. There is a long history, an apprenticeship of over
tens, hundreds of years, with its successive episodes, at times of pain, of
greatness for sure, and conflict also, between us European brothers. We have
had to overcome our rivalries, even the most violent, without ever forgetting
them. I do not know whether we have emerged stronger from these European trials
that helped shape the history of the world; but what I am convinced of,
however, is that, through them, we have come to believe in a society built on
solidarity. Europe is Michelangelo, Shakespeare, Descartes, Beethoven, Marx,
Freud, Picasso. It was they who taught us, like so many others, the shared
foundations, balancing nature and culture, the religious and the secular, faith
and science, the individual and the community. It is because we share this
heritage, because it is so deeply rooted in our collective being, and goes on
nourishing the achievements that we have been, are still and will continue to
be capable of in the future, that we have been able to put an end to our
internal turf wars.
But the demon
that makes us repeat our errors of the past is never far away. This is what
happened during that fateful weekend. Without entering into detail about
whether the measures imposed on Greece were welcome, legitimate, effective,
appropriate, what I want to underline here is that the context in which this
diktat was issued has created a crippling situation.
That the
amateurism of the Greek government and the relative inaction of their
predecessors went beyond the pale, this I accept. That the coalition of
creditors led by the Germans was exasperated by the situation thus created,
this I understand. But these political leaders seemed far too savvy to want to
seize the opportunity of an ideological victory over a far left government at
the expense of fragmenting the Union. Because that is what it comes down to. In
counting our billions instead of using them to build, in refusing to accept an
albeit obvious loss by constantly postponing any commitment on reducing the
debt, in preferring to humiliate a people because they are unable to reform,
and putting resentments – however justified – before projects for the future,
we are turning our backs on what Europe should be, we are turning our backs on
Habermas’ citizen solidarity. We are expending all our energies on infighting
and running the risk of triggering a break-up. This is where we are. A
Eurozone, in which you, my German friends, would lay down your law with a few
Baltic and Nordic states in tow, is unacceptable for all the rest.
The euro was
conceived as an imperfect monetary union forged on an ambiguous agreement
between France and Germany. For Germany, it was about organising a fixed
exchange rate system around the Deutschmark and, through this, imposing a
certain ordo-liberal vision of economic policy. For France, it was a matter of
rather naively and romantically establishing an international reserve currency
equal to the grand ambitions of its elites. We now need to get out of that
initial ambiguity, which has become destructive, and get out of its
self-centred plans, even if we all know that one only gets out of ambiguity at
one’s own cost. This will require a common effort in France as well as in
Germany. Both countries face major obstacles along this road. Germany is
trapped in a misleading and inconsistent story about how the monetary union
works, and which is widely shared by its political classes and people.
Conversely, in France, laziness and the latent sovereignism of the economic and
intellectual elites is such that there is no story, not any intelligent,
renovated vision of the architecture of monetary union that could find popular
support. We need to invent this common vision, and fast.
Don’t tell me
you expect to save Europe simply by imposing rules of sound management. No one
is more committed than I am to respecting the equilibrium; it is what has
always drawn us closer together. But you have to build this respect through
democracy and dialogue, through reason, and not by force.
Don’t tell me
that, if this is the way it is and some don’t want to know, then you will just
continue on your journey without them. Falling back on the North will never
suffice to save you. Like all Europeans, you need the whole of Europe to
survive, divided we are too small. With globalisation we are witnessing the
emergence of vast geographical and economic areas which are going to be
complementing one another and competing with one another for decades, maybe
centuries. The zones of influence and alliances that are forming are likely to
be long lasting. Everyone can see the North American Plate taking shape. It
will cluster around the United States its Canadian and Mexican satellites, and
perhaps others further afield. All the signs suggest that South America will be
able to achieve some sort of autonomy. In Asia, two or three zones could
materialize, depending on whether, in addition to China and India, Japan will
be able to attract sufficient solidarity around itself, precisely because it
too is too small alone. Africa is awakening, at last, but it needs us. As for
the Muslim world, troubled today by the turmoil emanating from a political use
of Islam by some, it will probably struggle to find unity within.
Europe could be
one of these players, but this is not yet certain. To do so, its ambition must
be to come together within the current Union and even beyond. To survive among
the giants, Europe will have to bring together all the territories contained
between the ice caps of the North, the snows of the Urals and the sands of the
South. It means rediscovering its roots and seeing the Mediterranean, in the space
of the next few decades, as our internal sea. Historical logic, economic
consistency, demographic security, to which I would add – however things may
seem – our cultural proximity, born of the dissemination of religions of the
Book, show us the way. Amidst all our internal conflicts, we are looking only
to the North and we are forgetting the South. Yet it is the cradle of our
culture. It’s what will bring Old Europe new blood in the form of the young
generations. And it is what will make Europe the gateway between East and West.
Alexander, Napoleon, our wild colonial ambitions, thought they could build this
unity by force of arms. The cruel and despicable method failed, but the
ambition had been founded. It still is.
The challenge
is sizeable. An alliance between a few European countries, even led by the most
powerful among them, will be subjugated by our friend and ally the United
States in the maybe not so distant future. There are some who have already
chosen that path. Those I said earlier were too long-sighted. But this does not
apply to all. And it’s to these others that I am speaking now.
The Europe I hope for must obviously
have its rules and discipline for our communal life, but it must also have a
political plan that transcends and justifies such constraints. Today this is
something everyone seems to have forgotten. Our European model can be a model
for all those who refuse to be put into the same mould from across the
Atlantic. But to be a model, Europe must have vision, rise above the pettiness,
play its role in globalization and, in a word, continue to shape History.
domingo, 19 de julho de 2015
A Europa de Varoufakis e Merkel e a antecipação do seu (não?) futuro...
(This conversation took place before the deal.)
Harry Lambert: So how are you feeling?
Yanis Varoufakis: I’m feeling on top of the world – I no longer have to
live through this hectic timetable, which was absolutely inhuman, just
unbelievable. I was on 2 hours sleep every day for five months. … I’m also
relieved I don’t have to sustain any longer this incredible pressure to
negotiate for a position I find difficult to defend, even if I managed to force
the other side to acquiesce, if you know what I mean.
HL: What was it like? Did you like any aspect of it?
YV: Oh well
a lot of it. But the inside information one gets… to have your worst fears
confirmed … To have “the powers that be” speak to you directly, and it be as
you feared – the situation was worse than you imagined! So that was fun,
to have the front row seat.
HL: What are you referring to?
YV: The
complete lack of any democratic scruples, on behalf of the supposed defenders
of Europe’s democracy. The quite clear understanding on the other side that we
are on the same page analytically – of course it will never come out at
present. [And yet] To have very powerful figures look at you in the eye and say
“You’re right in what you’re saying, but we’re going to crunch you anyway.”
HL: You’ve said creditors objected to you because
“I try and talk economics in the Eurogroup, which nobody does.” What happened
when you did?
YV: It’s
not that it didn’t go down well – it’s that there was point blank refusal to
engage in economic arguments. Point blank. … You put forward an argument that
you’ve really worked on – to make sure it’s logically coherent – and you’re
just faced with blank stares. It is as if you haven’t spoken. What you say is
independent of what they say. You might as well have sung the Swedish national
anthem – you’d have got the same reply. And that’s startling, for somebody
who’s used to academic debate. … The other side always engages. Well there was
no engagement at all. It was not even annoyance, it was as if one had not
spoken.
HL: When you first arrived, in early February,
this can’t have been a unified position?
YV: Well
there were people who were sympathetic at a personal level – so, you know,
behind closed doors, on an informal basis, especially from the IMF. [HL:
“From the highest levels?” YV: “From the highest levels, from the
highest levels.”] But then inside the Eurogroup, a few kind words and that’s
it, back behind the parapet of the official version.
[But] Schäuble was consistent throughout. His view was
“I’m not discussing the programme – this was accepted by the previous
government and we can’t possibly allow an election to change anything. Because
we have elections all the time, there are 19 of us, if every time there was an
election and something changed, the contracts between us wouldn’t mean
anything.”
So at that point I had to get up and say “Well perhaps
we should simply not hold elections anymore for indebted countries”, and there
was no answer. The only interpretation I can give [of their view] is “Yes, that
would be a good idea, but it would be difficult to do. So you either sign on
the dotted line or you are out.”
HL: And Merkel?
YV: You have to
understand I never had anything to do with Merkel, finance ministers talk to
finance ministers, prime ministers talk to Chancellors. From my understanding,
she was very different. She tried to placate the Prime Minister [Tsipras]
– she said “We’ll find a solution, don’t worry about it, I won’t let
anything awful happen, just do your homework and work with the institutions,
work with the Troika; there can be no dead end here.”
This is not what I heard from my counterpart – both
from the head of the Eurogroup and Dr Schäuble, they were very clear. At some
point it was put to me very unequivocally: “This is a horse and either you get
on it or it is dead.”
HL: Right so when was that?
YV: From
the beginning, from the very beginning. [They first met in early February.]
HL: So why hang around until the summer?
YV: Well
one doesn’t have an alternative. Our government was elected with a mandate to
negotiate. So our first mandate was to create the space and time to have a
negotiation and reach another agreement. That was our mandate – our mandate was
to negotiate, it was not to come to blows with our creditors. …
The negotiations took ages, because the other side was
refusing to negotiate. They insisted on a “comprehensive agreement”, which
meant they wanted to talk about everything. My interpretation is that when you
want to talk about everything, you don’t want to talk about anything. But we
went along with that.
And look there were absolutely no positions put
forward on anything by them. So they would… let me give you an example. They
would say we need all your data on the fiscal path on which Greek finds itself,
we need all the data on state-owned enterprises. So we spent a lot of time
trying to provide them with all the data and answering questionnaires and
having countless meetings providing the data.
So that would be the first phase. The second phase was
where they’d ask us what we intended to do on VAT. They would then reject our
proposal but wouldn’t come up with a proposal of their own. And then, before we
would get a chance to agree on VAT with them, they would shift to another
issue, like privatisation. They would ask what we want to do about
privatisation, we put something forward, they would reject it. Then they’d move
onto another topic, like pensions, from there to product markets, from there to
labour relations, from labour relations to all sorts of things right? So it was
like a cat chasing its own tail.
We felt, the government felt, that we couldn’t
discontinue the process. Look, my suggestion from the beginning was this: This
is a country that has run aground, that ran aground a long time ago. … Surely
we need to reform this country – we are in agreement on this. Because time is of
the essence, and because during negotiations the central bank was squeezing
liquidity [on Greek banks] in order pressurise us, in order to succumb, my
constant proposal to the Troika was very simple: let us agree on three or four
important reforms that we agree upon, like the tax system, like VAT, and let’s
implement them immediately. And you relax the restrictions on liqiuidity from
the ECB. You want a comprehensive agreement – let’s carry on negotiating –
and in the meantime let us introduce these reforms in
parliament by agreement between us and you.
And they said “No, no, no, this has to be a
comprehensive review. Nothing will be implemented if you dare introduce any
legislation. It will be considered unilateral action inimical to the process of
reaching an agreement.” And then of course a few months later they would leak
to the media that we had not reformed the country and that we were wasting
time! And so… [chuckles] we were set up, in a sense, in an important sense.
So by the time the liquidity almost ran out
completely, and we were in default, or quasi-default, to the IMF, they
introduced their proposals, which were absolutely impossible… totally
non-viable and toxic. So they delayed and then came up with the kind of
proposal you present to another side when you don’t want an agreement.
HL: Did you try working together with the
governments of other indebted countries?
YV: The answer is
no, and the reason is very simple: from the very beginning those particular
countries made it abundantly clear that they were the most energetic enemies of
our government, from the very beginning. And the reason of course was their
greatest nightmare was our success: were we to succeed in negotiating a better
deal for Greece, that would of course obliterate them politically, they would
have to answer to their own people why they didn’t negotiate like we were
doing.
HL: And partnering with sympathetic parties, like
Podemos?
YV: Not really. I
mean we always had a good relationship with them, but there was nothing they
could do – their voice could never penetrate the Eurogroup. And indeed the more
they spoke out in our favour, which they did, the more inimical the Finance
Minister representing that country became towards us.
HL: And George Osborne? What were your dealings
like with him?
YV: Oh very
good, very pleasant, excellent. But he is out of the loop, he is not part of
the Eurogroup. When I spoke to him on a number of occasions you could see that
was very sympathetic. And indeed if you look at the Telegraph, the
greatest supporters of our cause have been the Tories! Because of their
Eurosceptism, eh… it’s not just Euroscepticsm; it’s a Burkean view of the
sovereignty of parliament – in our case it was very clear that our parliament
was being treated like rubbish.
HL: What is the greatest problem with the general
way the Eurogroup functions?
YV: [To
exemplify…] There was a moment when the President of the Eurogroup decided to
move against us and effectively shut us out, and made it known that Greece was
essentially on its way out of the Eurozone. … There is a convention that communiqués
must be unanimous, and the President can’t just convene a meeting of the
Eurozone and exclude a member state. And he said, “Oh I’m sure I can do that.”
So I asked for a legal opinion. It created a bit of a kerfuffle. For about 5-10
minutes the meeting stopped, clerks, officials were talking to one another, on
their phone, and eventually some official, some legal expert addressed me, and
said the following words, that “Well, the Eurogroup does not exist in law,
there is no treaty which has convened this group.”
So what we have is a non-existent group that has the
greatest power to determine the lives of Europeans. It’s not answerable to
anyone, given it doesn’t exist in law; no minutes are kept; and it’s
confidential. So no citizen ever knows what is said within. … These are
decisions of almost life and death, and no member has to answer to anybody.
HL: And is that group controlled by German
attitudes?
YV: Oh
completely and utterly. Not attitudes – by the finance minister of Germany. It
is all like a very well-tuned orchestra and he is the director. Everything
happens in tune. There will be times when the orchestra is out of tune, but he
convenes and puts it back in line.
HL: Is there no alternative power within the
group, can the French counter that power?
YV: Only
the French finance minister has made noises that were different from the German
line, and those noises were very subtle. You could sense he
had to use very judicious language, to be seen not to oppose. And in the final
analysis, when Doc Schäuble responded and effectively determined the official
line, the French FM in the end would always fold and accept.
HL: Let’s talk about your theoretical background,
and your piece on Marx in 2013, when you said:
“A Greek or a Portuguese or an Italian exit from the
Eurozone would soon lead to a fragmentation of European capitalism, yielding a
seriously recessionary surplus region east of the Rhine and north of the Alps,
while the rest of Europe is would be in the grip of vicious stagflation. Who do
you think would benefit from this development? A progressive left, that will
rise Phoenix-like from the ashes of Europe’s public institutions? Or the Golden
Dawn Nazis, the assorted neofascists, the xenophobes and the spivs? I have
absolutely no doubt as to which of the two will do best from a disintegration
of the eurozone.”
…so would a Grexit inevitably help Golden Dawn, do you
still think that?
YV: Well,
look, I don’t believe in deterministic versions of history. Syriza now is a
very dominant force. If we manage to get out of this mess
united, and handle properly a Grexit … it would be possible to have an
alternative. But I’m not sure we would manage it, because managing the collapse
of a monetary union takes a great deal of expertise, and I’m not sure we have
it here in Greece without the help of outsiders.
HL: You must have been thinking about a Grexit
from day one...
YV: Yes,
absolutely.
HL: ...have preparations been made?
YV: The
answer is yes and no. We had a small group, a ‘war cabinet’ within the
ministry, of about five people that were doing this: so we worked out in
theory, on paper, everything that had to be done [to prepare for/in the event
of a Grexit]. But it’s one thing to do that at the level of 4-5 people, it’s
quite another to prepare the country for it. To prepare the country an
executive decision had to be taken, and that decision was never taken.
HL: And in the past week, was that a decision you
felt you were leaning towards [preparing for Grexit]?
YV: My view
was, we should be very careful not to activate it. I didn’t want this to become
a self-fulfilling prophecy. I didn’t want this to be like Nietzsche’s famous
dictum that if you stare into the abyss long enough, the abyss will stare back
at you. But I also believed that at the moment the Eurogroup shut out banks
down, we should energise this process.
HL: Right. So there were two options as far as I
can see – an immediate Grexit, or printing IOUs and taking bank control of the
Bank of Greece [potentially but not necessarily precipitating a Grexit]?
YV: Sure, sure. I
never believed we should go straight to a new currency. My view was – and I put
this to the government – that if they dared shut our banks down, which I
considered to be an aggressive move of incredible potency, we should respond
aggressively but without crossing the point of no return.
We should issue our own IOUs, or even at least
announce that we’re going to issue our own euro-denominated liquidity; we
should haircut the Greek 2012 bonds that the ECB held, or announce we were
going to do it; and we should take control of the Bank of Greece. This was the
triptych, the three things, which I thought we should respond with if the ECB
shut down our banks.
… I was warning the Cabinet this was going to happen
[the ECB shut our banks] for a month, in order to drag us into a humiliating
agreement. When it happened – and many of my colleagues couldn’t believe it
happened – my recommendation for responding “energetically”, let’s say, was
voted down.
HL: And how close was it to happening?
YV: Well
let me say that out of six people we were in a minority of two. … Once it
didn’t happen I got my orders to close down the banks consensually with the ECB
and the Bank of Greece, which I was against, but I did because I’m a team
player, I believe in collective responsibility.
And then the referendum happened, and the referendum
gave us an amazing boost, one that would have justified this type of energetic
response [his plan] against the ECB, but then that very night the government
decided that the will of the people, this resounding ‘No’, should not be what
energised the energetic approach [his plan].
Instead it should lead to major concessions to the
other side: the meeting of the council of political leaders, with our Prime Minister
accepting the premise that whatever happens, whatever the other side does, we
will never respond in any way that challenges them. And essentially that means
folding. … You cease to negotiate.
HL: So you can’t hold out much hope now, that
this deal will be much better than last week’s – if anything it will be worse?
YV: If anything
it will be worse. I trust and hope that our government will insist on debt
restructuring, but I can’t see how the German finance minister is ever going to
sign up to this in the forthcoming Eurogroup meeting. If he does, it will be a
miracle.
HL: Exactly – because, as you’ve explained, your
leverage is gone at this point?
YV: I think
so, I think so. Unless he [Schäuble] gets his marching orders from the
Chancellor. That remains to be seen, whether she will step in to do that.
HL: To come back out again, could you possibly
explain, in layman’s terms for our readers, your objections to Piketty’s
"Capital"?
YV: Well let me
say firstly, I feel embarrassed because Piketty has been extremely supportive
of me and the government, and I have been horrible to him in my review of his
book! I really appreciate his position over the last few months, and I’m going
to say this to him when I meet him in September.
But my criticism of his book stands. His sentiment is
correct. His abhorrence of inequality… [inaudible]. His analysis, however,
undermines the argument, as far as I am concerned. Because in his book the
neoclassical model of capitalism gives very little room for building the case
he wants to build up, except by building upon the model a very specific set of
parameters, which undermines his own case. In other words, if I was an opponent
of his thesis that inequality is built into capitalism, I would be able to take
apart his case by attacking his analysis.
HL: I don’t want to get too detailed, because
this isn’t going to make the final cut...
YV: Yes…
HL: ...but it’s about his metric of wealth?
YV: Yes, he uses
a definition of capital which makes capital impossible to understand – so it’s
a contradiction of terms. [Click here—link to add: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2014/10/08/6006/—for
Varoufakis’ critical review of Piketty’s Capital.]
HL: Let’s come back to the crisis. I really
understand very little of your relationship with Tsipras…
YV: I’ve
known him since late 2010, because I was a prominent critic of the government
at the time, even though I was close to it once upon a time. I was close to the
Papandreou family – I still am in a way – but I became prominent … back then it
was big news that a former adviser was saying “We’re pretending bankruptcy
didn’t happen, we’re trying to cover it up with new unsustainable loans,” that
kind of thing.
I made some waves back then, and Tsipras was a very young
leader trying to understand what was going on, what the crisis was about, and
how he should position himself.
HL: Was there a first meeting you remember?
YV: Oh yes. It
was late 2010, we went to a cafeteria, there were three of us, and my
recollection is that he wasn’t clear back then what his views were, on the
drachma versus the euro, on the causes of the crises, and I had very, well
shall I say, “set views” on what was going on. And a dialogue begun which
unfolded over the years and one that… I believe that I helped shape his
view of what should be done.
HL: So how does it feel now, after
four-and-a-half years, to no longer be working by his side?
YV: Well I don’t
feel that way, I feel that we’re very close. Our parting was extremely
amicable. We’ve never had a bad problem between us, never, not to this day. And
I’m extremely close to Euclid Tsakalotos [the new finance minister].
HL: And presumably you’re still speaking with
them both this week?
YV: I
haven’t spoken to the Prime Minister this week, in the past couple of days, but
I speak to Euclid, yes, and I consider Euclid to be very close to be, and
vice-versa, and I don’t envy him at all. [Chuckling.]
HL: Would you be shocked if Tsipras resigned?
YV: Nothing
shocks me these days – our Eurozone is a very inhospitable place for decent
people. It wouldn’t shock me either to stay on and accepts a very bad deal.
Because I can understand he feels he has an obligation to the people that
support him, support us, not to let this country become a failed state.
But I’m not going to betray my own view, that I honed
back in 2010, that this country must stop extending and pretending, we must
stop taking on new loans pretending that we’ve solved the problem, when we
haven’t; when we have made our debt even less sustainable on condition of
further austerity that even further shrinks the economy; and shifts the burden
further onto the have nots, creating a humanitarian crisis. It’s something I’m
not going to accept. I’m not going to be party to.
HL: Final question – will you stay close
with anyone who you had to negotiate with?
YV: Um, I’m
not sure. I’m not going to mention any names now just in case I destroy their
careers! [Laughs]
sexta-feira, 17 de julho de 2015
O Professor Emmerich Krause e os contratos em Portugal
É um Professor de diversas Universidades do Estado de Turíngia, na Alemanha.
A sua tese de doutoramento é uma grossa reflexão de 4 volumes e meio intitulada “Ensaio sobre a Dinâmica Contratual Consoante o Credor – Contributo para uma Teoria Dinâmica do Dinamismo Contratual”. O meio volume é apenas a bibliografia consultada. Esta interessante obra, que está a marcar a ciência jurídica contemporânea, procura explicar a razão de haver contratos com destinos muito diferentes consoante as partes envolvidas. O Professor Krause deslocou-se a Portugal na semana passada, pois parece que somos o país mais avançado do mundo nesta matéria, e realizou trabalho de campo valioso. Em rigoroso exclusivo, as notas do Professor Krause na sua viagem a Portugal.
“Portugal, que já deu novos mundos ao mundo”, surpreendeu-me; afinal, Portugal também está a dar novos contratos ao mundo. Procurei por tantos países experiências que comprovassem as minhas teses, mas nunca tinha encontrado nada assim. Para simplificar, fiz uma categorização dos tipos raros de contratos que descobri e que nunca tinham sido observados a olho nu:
1. Contratos-fingimento – Esta curiosa categoria de contratos é muito surpreendente. Trata-se de contratos em que uma das partes assume plenamente que as suas obrigações não são para cumprir, sabendo, de antemão, que a outra parte não irá exigir o seu cumprimento, nem se preocupar muito com o assunto. São muito utilizados quando há compras a empresas alemãs de material militar ou quando se vendem empresas à China. Determina-se que as empresas estrangeiras têm que construir fábricas ou fazer outros investimentos, mas, passado uns tempos, o dinamismo contratual inerente faz com que essas obrigações desapareçam e fiquem adiadas até ver. É um extraordinário exemplo de obrigações contratuais descartáveis, uma brilhante inovação portuguesa.
2. Contratos-de-pedra – Dei este nome imortal a esta categoria de contratos. São contratos que vivem, sobrevivem e tornarão a viver para todo o sempre. Trata-se mesmo de uma situação de imobilismo contratual que daria para criar toda uma nova tese da ciência dos contratos. São contratos tão inalteráveis e rigídos que até dão para partir a cabeça de arremesso, se for necessário. Quando se discute a sua alteração, decide-se sempre que não podem ser alterados sob pena de o Estado de Direito acabar já amanhã. Exemplos destes contratos envolvem sempre investimentos avultados em contratações público-privadas e pagamentos ao Estado relacionados com energia. Admirável mundo novo contratual português!…
3. Contratos de requalificação – Esta espécie exótica de contratos é uma originalidade portuguesa. Diria mesmo que no glorioso firmamento contratual, esta é a espécie que cintila destacada de todas as outras. Trata-se de contratos de trabalho que contém em si os germes da sua própria destruição. Eu explico. Através da celebração de um contrato de trabalho, poderá haver lugar à requalificação. Só que não é a requalificação do trabalhador. É mesmo a requalificação do contrato, que passa a ser requalificado na sua não existência. Ou seja, através da requalificação, faz-se desaparecer o contrato num golpe de magia. O contrato e o trabalhador. De génio. Estes portugueses sabem o que fazem.
4. Contratos-não contratos – Foi este o contrato pelo qual me apaixonei e ao qual gostava de dedicar a minha obra final. Um contrato que se nega a si próprio. Um contrato que é em si um não contrato. Um contrato que nega a sua própria existência numa vertigem demente. Um contrato que se contorce e desaparece. O exemplo mais típico e acabado deste contrato são os contratos envolvem pensões de reforma do Estado. Num momento, existem. No outro, não. Num momento, pode haver pensão. Passado uns meses, pode haver outra pensão bem mais baixa. E tudo com o mesmo contrato. No fundo, não existe contrato nenhum. Desde o astrolábio náutico que os portugueses não inventavam algo tão genial.”
A sua tese de doutoramento é uma grossa reflexão de 4 volumes e meio intitulada “Ensaio sobre a Dinâmica Contratual Consoante o Credor – Contributo para uma Teoria Dinâmica do Dinamismo Contratual”. O meio volume é apenas a bibliografia consultada. Esta interessante obra, que está a marcar a ciência jurídica contemporânea, procura explicar a razão de haver contratos com destinos muito diferentes consoante as partes envolvidas. O Professor Krause deslocou-se a Portugal na semana passada, pois parece que somos o país mais avançado do mundo nesta matéria, e realizou trabalho de campo valioso. Em rigoroso exclusivo, as notas do Professor Krause na sua viagem a Portugal.
“Portugal, que já deu novos mundos ao mundo”, surpreendeu-me; afinal, Portugal também está a dar novos contratos ao mundo. Procurei por tantos países experiências que comprovassem as minhas teses, mas nunca tinha encontrado nada assim. Para simplificar, fiz uma categorização dos tipos raros de contratos que descobri e que nunca tinham sido observados a olho nu:
1. Contratos-fingimento – Esta curiosa categoria de contratos é muito surpreendente. Trata-se de contratos em que uma das partes assume plenamente que as suas obrigações não são para cumprir, sabendo, de antemão, que a outra parte não irá exigir o seu cumprimento, nem se preocupar muito com o assunto. São muito utilizados quando há compras a empresas alemãs de material militar ou quando se vendem empresas à China. Determina-se que as empresas estrangeiras têm que construir fábricas ou fazer outros investimentos, mas, passado uns tempos, o dinamismo contratual inerente faz com que essas obrigações desapareçam e fiquem adiadas até ver. É um extraordinário exemplo de obrigações contratuais descartáveis, uma brilhante inovação portuguesa.
2. Contratos-de-pedra – Dei este nome imortal a esta categoria de contratos. São contratos que vivem, sobrevivem e tornarão a viver para todo o sempre. Trata-se mesmo de uma situação de imobilismo contratual que daria para criar toda uma nova tese da ciência dos contratos. São contratos tão inalteráveis e rigídos que até dão para partir a cabeça de arremesso, se for necessário. Quando se discute a sua alteração, decide-se sempre que não podem ser alterados sob pena de o Estado de Direito acabar já amanhã. Exemplos destes contratos envolvem sempre investimentos avultados em contratações público-privadas e pagamentos ao Estado relacionados com energia. Admirável mundo novo contratual português!…
3. Contratos de requalificação – Esta espécie exótica de contratos é uma originalidade portuguesa. Diria mesmo que no glorioso firmamento contratual, esta é a espécie que cintila destacada de todas as outras. Trata-se de contratos de trabalho que contém em si os germes da sua própria destruição. Eu explico. Através da celebração de um contrato de trabalho, poderá haver lugar à requalificação. Só que não é a requalificação do trabalhador. É mesmo a requalificação do contrato, que passa a ser requalificado na sua não existência. Ou seja, através da requalificação, faz-se desaparecer o contrato num golpe de magia. O contrato e o trabalhador. De génio. Estes portugueses sabem o que fazem.
4. Contratos-não contratos – Foi este o contrato pelo qual me apaixonei e ao qual gostava de dedicar a minha obra final. Um contrato que se nega a si próprio. Um contrato que é em si um não contrato. Um contrato que nega a sua própria existência numa vertigem demente. Um contrato que se contorce e desaparece. O exemplo mais típico e acabado deste contrato são os contratos envolvem pensões de reforma do Estado. Num momento, existem. No outro, não. Num momento, pode haver pensão. Passado uns meses, pode haver outra pensão bem mais baixa. E tudo com o mesmo contrato. No fundo, não existe contrato nenhum. Desde o astrolábio náutico que os portugueses não inventavam algo tão genial.”